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The Inter-temporal Character of International and
Comparative Law Regarding the Rights of the
Indigenous Populations of the World
I.

A

PRELUDE TO FURTHER IN-DEPTH STUDIES

This report explores ways and means in a selection of comparative legal systems to ensure adequate protection ofthe rights of indigenous peoples within the territorial confines of national jurisdictions.
In most contemporary legal systems, attention has been drawn to the
problems of how best to protect and safeguard the various fundamental rights of indigenous peoples of different tribes and denominations,
co-existing in a single or multiple legal system. 1 To ensure their survival and continued co-existence, not only their rights, but also their
cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations, must be preserved
intact as distinct but unique social, cultural, political and economic
grouping within the same national community. 2
Unwittingly or otherwise, the evolution of national legal awareness of the need for a contemporary society to provide reliable political, economic, cultural and social security safety nets for its
indigenous people has contributed in no small measures to the growSoMPONG SucHARITKUL, D.C.L., D. Phil., M.A. (Oxon); Docteur en Droit (Paris); LL.M.
(Harvard); of the Middle Temple, Barrister-at-law; Associate Dean and Distinguished
Professor of International and Comparative Law, Golden Gate University School of
Law, San Francisco, U.S.A. The author would like to express his gratitude to Professor Christian Okeke for his valuable suggestions and for presenting this report at the
16'h Congress of the International Academy of Comparative Law.
1. See Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic,
Religious or Linguistic Minorities, G.A. Res. 47/135, 18 December 1992; U.N Draft
Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub 2/1994/2/Add
20 April 1994, and American Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, OAS
Declaration 1997 OAS. G.A.Res. OEA/Ser. P, AG/Doc. 3573/97 (1997). See also Falk,
"The Right of Self-determination under International Law: The Coherence of Doctrine
versus the Coherence of Experience," in Wolfgang Danspechgruber & A. Watts (eds.),
Self-determination and Self-administration 47 (1997), at 55, 61.
2. See Erica-Irene Daes, Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People, AReport by the Special Repporteur of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities, Chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N., N.Y. & Geneva 1997, Office of the High Commissioner for Human
Rights, Study Series 10, 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights 1948-1998. See also the Report on the Working Group on Indigenous Populations for its 18'h session, Geneva, July 2001, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/24, 17 Aug. 2000, by
President-Rapporteur, Miguel Alfonso Martinez and its Annexes.
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ing international consciousness of the imperative necessity to protect
the precious cultures, traditions, ways of life and civilizations of
every indigenous people in the world. 3 Inasmuch as it is desirable to
preserve for succeeding generations the endangered species and the
bio-diversity of the rich living resources of the sea, the land and the
atmosphere, 4 it is incumbent upon the current generation also to
strive to protect the security, safety and social welfare of members of
our own kind, the humankind, especially the indigenous peoples in
each country.
In this connection, the progressive development of international
law tends to reflect, if not in some instances to circumscribe, the material progress achieved in national communities. The interplay between national laws and the law of nations in legal development is
worthy of the greatest attention. Any meaningful attempt to seek guidance to ascertain the appropriate direction in which to find practical
and plausible ways and means to guarantee the continued co-existence of indigenous peoples as distinct social collectivities and autonomous communities within the national entities must be preceded by
an endeavor to appreciate the inter-action between international and
national policies and regulations, and the mutual enhancement of the
degree of protection between national and minimum international or
universal standards. It is in this domain that the study of comparative law is vital to the basic understanding of international legal developments. It will be seen how the use of comparative law
techniques can serve to promote, reinforce and accelerate the process
of crystallization of emerging norms of international law designed to
3. Henry J. Steiner & Philip Alston, International Human Rights in Context
(2nd ed. 2000). Note the existence of two binding instruments of general application
to indigenous peoples: The 1957 ILO Convention No. 106 and ILO Convention No. 169
effective 1991. Work on the Draft Declaration on the Right of Indigenous Peoples of
1994 began in 1977 with the creation of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities. A movement to recognize the interests of indigenous peoples has acted in
eamest for the past 15 years. The right of indigenous peoples has since gained increasing recognition as distinctive communities deserving a special intemationallaw
regime distinct from individual rights and the rights of minorities. Indeed, indigenous
peoples often constitute minorities in a modem westem style community, but indigenous peoples are not precluded from directing the administration of a country, nor
from becoming majorities in a given society. On July 28, 2000, the United Nations
Economic and Social Council decided to establish, by consensus resolution. a "Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues" as a subsidiary organ of the Council. ECOSOC Res.
2000/22.
4. See The U.S. Endangered Species Act of 1973, EAS (16 U.S.C.A. § 1660 to
1614), Renewable Resources Extension Act of 1978, RREA, (16 U.S.C.A.
§ 1671-1676). On the intemational plane, See, for instance, The RIO Declaration on
Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro 1992 (27 Principles), The Washington
Declaration on Protection of the Marine Environment for Land-based Activities,
Washington 1995, as adopted on 1 November 1995, and Convention on Biological Diversity, entered into force from 29 December 1995. For status of ratification, as of 10
July 1995, See UNEP Handbook of Environmental Law 271-74 (1999).
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preserve and protect the political, economic, social and cultural values of indigenous peoples populating the earth. On the other hand,
adherence to generally accepted norms of international law will serve
the cause of the indigenous peoples within any given national legal
order.
A survey of general legal aspects and different dimensions of the
subject of this report requires an initial and detailed systematic analysis and a thorough examination of a given situation leading to the
consideration of substantive rights, individual and collective, which
are specifically pertinent to ensure the healthful survival of indigenous civilizations. The present report is but a necessary prelude to
further in-depth studies on the rights of the indigenous peoples.
In this report, certain basic questions will be addressed in order
to pave the way to a better appreciation of the delicate and complex
task ahead.

II.

THE UsE oF TERMS

For the purpose of this report, as indeed for most other purposes,
the first and foremost hurdle to overcome is the ascription of a precise
meaning to the use of crucial terms, or a meaningful response to definitional questions. The Preamble of the San Francisco Charter of
1945 starts with the opening phrase "We the peoples ... " The term
"peoples" has never ceased to encounter countless difficulties in various contexts surrounding the right of self-determination of "peoples"
within a national unit. All the more perplexing is this term "peoples"
in regard to the right of secession, which is admitted as a collective
constitutional right in some countries 5 but is considered as undermining national territorial integrity of the federal union in others. 6
5. See Article 70, 71 and 72, Chapter 8 of the USSR Constitution of October 7,
1977, Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, Moscow 0977).
Article 70: "The USSR is an integral, federal, multinational State formed on the principle of socialist federalism as a result of the self-determination of nations and the
voluntary association of equal Soviet Socialist Republics ... "
Article 71 lists 14 units of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republics.
Article 72 : "Each Union Republic shall retain the right freely to secede from the
USSR."
As indeed in reality, the Soviet Socialist Republics did secede from the USSR upon its
disintegration, namely Ukraine, Latvia, Lithunia, Estonia, Azerbaijan, Moldava, Kazakhstan, Georgia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Krygyzstan, Armenia, Belarus, Uzbekistan. Chechnya, however, was not listed as a distinct member of the Union of the
Soviet Socialist Republics.
6. The U.S. Constitution recognizes no such right or freedom for any state of the
Federal Union to secede. For Reference re Secession of Quebec, see Opinion of the
Supreme Court of Canada [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217, 37 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1342 (1998). The
Supreme Court cited the Constitutional Act, 1876 as an act of nation-building and
that federalism was the political mechanism by which diversity could be recognized
with unity. The Constitution Act 1982 removed the last vestige of British authority
and re-affirmed the country's commitment to the protection of its minority, to equality
and to the fundamental freedoms as declared in the Canadian Charter of Rights and
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This marked absence of a generally accepted definition of the term
"peoples" does not appear helpful to the search for an agreed use of
the term "indigenous peoples".
Unless a clearer definition of "indigenousness" could timely be
found, there would seem to be little or no likelihood of a generally
accepted definition of "indigenous peoples". Indeed, the U.N. Draft
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples neatly managed to
avoid any attempt to define the concept of "indigenous peoples". 7
Even without a precise definition or an express provision on the
use of the term "indigenous peoples" in the present context, it is nonetheless useful, as an indication of a general notion or conception of
the term, 8 as used in an international instrument, such as the ILO
Freedoms. The Court observed that a right to secede 'unilaterally' is the right to effectuate secession without prior negotiation with the other provinces and the federal
government. At issue is the legality of the final act of purported unilateral secession.
"The federalism principle, in conjunction with the democratic principle, dictates that
the clear repudiation of the existing constitutional order and the clear expression of
the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province (even after a referendum procedure) could give rise to a reciprocal obligation on all parties to confederation to negotiate constitutional changes to respond to that desire ... (para. 88)" The
court thus disclaimed any supervisory role over the political aspects of constitutional
negotiation. "Both the legality of the acts of the parties to the negotiation process
under Canadian law, and the perceived legitimacy of such action, would be important
considerations in the negotiations process ... (para. 103)" The Opinion cited relevant
portions of international documents, including G. A. Resolution 50/6 of 9 November
1995 U.N. Declaration on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary which in Article 7
provides that the member States ofthe U.N. will continue to reaffirm the right of selfdetermination of all peoples ... This shall not be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action that would dismember or impair totally or in part. the territorial
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples ... (para. 114). There is no necessary incompatibility between the maintenance of
the territorial integrity of existing States, including Canada, and the· right of a people
to achieve a full measure of self-determination.
The Court noted, in paragraph 139, "However, the concern of aboriginal peoples is
precipitated by asserted right of Quebec to unilateral secession. In lights of our finding... that on the contrary a clear democratic expression of support for secession
would lead under the constitution to negotiation in which aboriginal interests would
be taken into account, it becomes unnecessary to explore further the concern of aboriginal peoples in this Reference."
7. See U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples 20 April1994
and the OAS draft cited in the note 1 above. The draft did not attempt to define indigenous peoples. The U.S. preliminary statement continued to resist the use of the term
"peoples" in the plural, and the characterization of indigenous rights as collective
right in both the U.N. and the OAS drafts. Brazil was equally reluctant to use the
term "peoples" because of its association with the right of self-determination, which
could entail the right to independent statehood and secession under international
law, in the absence of any prohibition or authorization of unilateral secession by a
people from within an existing sovereign and independent State.
8. Reisman, "Protecting Indigenous Rights in International Adjudication," 89
A.J.I.L. 350 (1995) refers to the "natives," "aborigines," or "indigenous peoples" as
ones who were the time that proto-human bands roamed the wilds and lost, they either resisted organized peoples who invaded their inhabited territories, or were denied, assimilation and survived with a distinct, but not necessarily intact, cultural
identity. The term has recently come to refer to a new pattern of claims, made by
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Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples of 1989 (Convention
No. 169)9 to mention some of the criteria commonly used, namely
aboriginality, cultural distinctiveness and self-identification 10 as attributes of "indigenousness".l 1 The United Nations special Reporteurs appear to use the term with reference to those peoples who,
"having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing in those territories or parts of them. They form at
present non-dominant sectors of societies and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations, their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identities, as the basis of their continued
existence as peoples in accordance with their own cultural patterns,
social institutions, and legal systems." 12
The ILO Convention No. 169, in Article 1, stipulates that the
Convention applies to "(b) peoples in independent countries who are
regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the countries, or by geographic region to which
the countries belong, at the time of the conquest or colonization or the
establishment of present State boundaries and who, irrespective of
their legal status retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political situations." 13 Article 2 regards self-identification
as indigenous or tribal as "a fundamental criterion for determining
the group to which the provisions of this Convention applies." 14
these surviving indigenous peoples for direct protection by the international community and where appropriate, restoration of rights taken from them in the past.
9. See Leary, "Lessons From the Experience of the Intemational Labour Organization," in The United Nations and Human Rights (P. Alston ed. 1992). Convention
No. 169 entered into force in 1991, requiring "special measures" be adopted to safeguard indigenous interests, and recognizing the rights of ownership and possession of
the peoples over the lands they traditionally occupy, and the right to retain their own
customs and institutions not incompatible with fundamental rights.
10. See Swepston, "A New Step in the Intemational Law on Indigenous and Tribal peoples: ILO Convention No. 169 of 1989," 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 677 (1990); see
also 28 Int'l Leg. Mats. 1382 (1989).
11. See Barsh, "The World's Indigenous Peoples," White Paper Submitted to Calvert Group by First Nations Development Institute First Peoples Worldwide: also by
the same author, "United Nations Seminar on Indigenous Peoples and States," 83
A.J.I.L. 599 (1989).
12. U.N. Special Reporteurs, Jose Martinez Cobo (1984) and Erica-Irene A. Daes
(1994) identified the three components of "indigenous" as including "aboriginality,"
"distinctive culture" and "self-identification."
13. Article 1(3) provides that the "use of the term 'peoples' in this Convention
shall not be construed as having any implication as regards the right which may attach to the term under intemationallaw". See also Barsh, "Indigenous Peoples in the
1990's: From Object to Subject of Intemational Law?," 7 Harv. Hum. Rts. J. 33, 35
(1994).
14. Self-identification by the group or a member of the group is a useful prerequisite of indigenousness. Minorities and indigenous peoples form objects of separate intemational instruments. De lege ferenda, indigenous peoples are to be distinguished
from minorities, although in many instances their rights are partially covered by the
rights available for the protection of minorities.
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U.N. reports and other recent international instruments appear
to relate more specifically to only one type of situations created by
European invasion, conquest and colonization of territories occupied
by indigenous populations of Northern and Southern American continents and the seizure of lands held by aboriginal tribes in Australia
and New Zealand. In reality, the need to preserve indigenous social
and cultural identities exists throughout the world. The problems encountered by indigenous peoples are far from uniform, ranging from
international endeavors to salvage and maintain indigenous identities and cultures after years of alien domination or colonization by
Western or European nations or by neighboring kingdoms,
princedoms or tribesmen to national self-preservation in an effort to
ward off or to pre-empt any display or threat of foreign superior force
or authority. While numerous studies have been made in an effort to
shed more light on the fate of indigenous populations in the United
States, Canada, Latin America, 15 Australia and New Zealand 16 with
comparable and contrasting approaches and varying degrees of success, very little or nothing has been published about indigenous civilizations in other parts of the world, such as Southeast Asia, China,
Japan, the Indian sub-continent, the Pacific Islands, and Africa.
The conceptual and definitional deficiencies inherent in fractional and sectarian approaches to the problems confronting indigenous populations of the world will become more transparent, if we
could extricate ourselves from the narrow confines of the societies in
which we live. Indeed, the world itself has evolved through the passage of millions of years, witnessing the ever-changing faces of the
earth and the evolutionary diversification of the human race and species. It has been suggested that all in all between 6,000 and 10,000
original cultures could be characterized as "indigenous," but most of
them were absorbed by the growth of modern Nation-States ages
ago. 17 It is not always clear, noted one author, 18 whether a particular
group is an "indigenous" people or "minorities". The difference is per
chance a matter of degree. 19 China, for instance, has always recognized at various times, the existence within the Celestial Empire of
15. See, e.g., Roberts, "The Protection of Indigenous Population's Cultural Property in Peru, Mexico and the United States," 4 Tulsa J. Camp. & Int'l L. 327 (1997);
and Kreimer, "The Beginnings of the Inter-American Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples," 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 271 (1996).
16. See generally Quentin-Baxter, "The U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples - The International and Constitutional Law Contexts," 29 Victoria U. Wellington L. Rev. 85 (1999).
17. See Barsh, White Paper, supra n. 11.
18. Id. and also supra n. 14.
19. Indigenous peoples may be in the majority, or in power for that matter, or
they may be included within different "minorities." Members of the indigenous peoples should enjoy the protection designed for the indigenous population and yet not
precluded from the enjoyment of minorities rights inasmuch as they may be partly
entitled also to minorities rights.
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distinct "minorities", as much indigenous to Mainland China as the
various Chinese ethnic groups themselves are aboriginal to East
Asia.
(a) "Aboriginality" as a necessary criterion is not in itself free of
imprecision. ''Ab origine" means from the very beginning. Thus, an
ethnic group that was first formed in a particular locality could be
said to be aboriginal and thereby satisfies the test of aboriginality.
This does not preclude the possibility of a multiplicity of different indigenous groups in one and the same geographical area or zone,
which again through the passage of millennia and centuries may
evolve or change its characteristics or its dimension or geographical
contour beyond recall, recollection or even recognition. For these reasons, "aboriginality" as a criterion is relative to the time frame within
which the term is used. 20
(b) "Cultural Distinctiveness" is another criterion that deserves
particular attention. Distinctiveness of a culture could in time fade
out or dissipate for various reasons due to the need or desirability of
assimilation or merger with another equally distinctive culture,
thereby losing its original uniqueness. Cultural distinctiveness has
its beginning, i.e., its aboriginality, but it could also fall into oblivion
or desuetude, out of vogue or fashion, losing its originality or blurring
its uniqueness. 21
(c) "Self-identification" constitutes a formal test. If, and as long
only as a group continues to identifY itself as an "indigenous" group,
its "indigenousness" is established and maintained unchallenged. Ratione cessante, whenever the group ceases to identifY itself as such, it
no longer retains its "indigenousness" and becomes blended with or
assimilated to the massive members of the society in which the group
has been integrated. Therefore, this last criterion also is coterminous
with a time-frame, outside of which it no longer exists or ceases to
exist as a distinctive indigenous people. 22

20. See generally Lokan, "From Recognition to Reconciliation; The Functions of
ABORIGINAL Rights Law," 23 Melbourne U.L.R. 65 (1999). The term 'aborigines' is
used, depending on the context, to refer to either the indigenous peoples of Australia,
the indigenous peoples of Canada, or indigenous peoples in general. See also Van der
Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 562: "Aboriginal rights arise from the prior occupation ofland,
but they also arise from the prior social organization and distinctive cultures of "aboriginal peoples on that land."
21. See Van der Peet [1996] 2 SCR 507, 562: "... courts must look at both the
relationship of an aboriginal claimant to the land and at the practices, customs and
traditions arising from the claimant's distinctive culture and society."
22. ld. " Courts must not focus so entirely on the relationship of aboriginal peoples with the land that they lose sight of the other factors relevant to the identification and defmition of aboriginal rights." See the U.N. Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination ('CERD'), Findings on the Native title Amendment Act 1998
(th), U.N. Doc. ERD/c/54/misc. 40/Rev.2 (18 March 1999).
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THE CHANGING POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY OF THE GLOBE

Most commentators on indigenous heritage 23 and the rights of
indigenous peoples 24 recognize the political vicissitudes which materially affect the transfer of territories and modification or rectification of national boundaries. The map of the globe today is not the
same as yesteryear. Indeed, the world map has undergone innumerable changes, including succession of states, disintegration of sovereign nations, merger and unification of states, annexation of
territories. Changes in national frontiers and boundaries have been
matters of frequent if not intermittent occurrences. New countries
are both created, established or dissolved, dismantled and removed
from the geographical coordinates wherein they used to be situated.
These are natural phenomena of the changing face of the surface of
the earth, thanks to the events that have taken place with the cycle of
war and peace or relative peacefulness and continual state of international and internal armed conflicts, resulting in territorial alteration
and modification of nationallandscapes. 25
The names of the countries are usually associated with their geographical location and dimension. Geography, at any rate, political
geography, as reflected in the boundary making and delimitation of
frontiers, territorial, maritime and aerial or atmospheric, changes
with time. It is therefore only pertinent that any reference to a particular locality or country for purposes of protection of indigenous rights
or cultural heritage must be qualified by the time element or the time
frame within which to engage a meaningful discussion. 26
Europeans are aware of the changing frontiers of Europe.
Belgium, Austria, Switzerland, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany and Former Yugoslavia provide ample evidences of fluctuation
in place names, country denomination and boundaries.27 Asians are
23. For the meaning of "heritage," Erica-Irene A. Daes in her report on the "Protection of the Heritage of Indigenous People," U.N., N.Y. and Geneva, 1997, defines
the term as "everything that belongs to the distinct identity of a people and which is
theirs to share, if they wish, with other peoples ...the creative production of human
thought and craftsmanship, such as songs, stories, scientific knowledge and
artworks .... inheritances from the past and from nature, such as human remains,
the natural factors of the landscape, and naturally-occurring species of plants and
animals with which the peoples have long been connected".
24. See generally Donald Craig Mitchell, Sold America: The Story of Alaska Native and Their Land, 1867-1959 (1997); and "Alaska v. Native Village of Venetie: Statutory Constitution or Judicial Usurpation? Why History Courts," 14 Alaska L. Rev.
353 (1997).
25. See Arsanjani, "Environmental Rights and Indigenous Wrongs," 9 St. Thomas
L. Rev. 85 (1960, and Triggs, "Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law:
Validity of the Native Title Amendment Act 1998," 23 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 372
(1999).
26. See generally Reisman, supra n. 8.
27. With the advent of the disintegration of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Former Yugoslavia, Europe has seen the rise of new members. See note 5
above.
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fully cognizant of the differences or absence thereof between Siam
and Thailand, Cambodia and Kampuchea, Burma and Myanmar,
Laos and Siam Lao, Vietnam (North, South and Vietcong) and Korea
(North and South). 28 Africans on the other hand are getting used to
new names for older nations such as Ethiopia, Abyssinia, the Gold
Coast, Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Mali, Gambia,
Zambia, Zaire, Zimbabwe, etc. 29 The list continues. 30
It is not practical, nor indeed desirable to evaluate the status of
the indigenous peoples within the territorial confines of a given nation or State without delineating the relevant time frame. The temporal dimension is essential to any useful discussion of the need to
protect the rights and heritage of the peoples who are considered to
be indigenous to the area, as a geographical unit at a given time,
within a designated time slot. 31
IV.

DEMOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION AND VoLUNTARY MoVEMENTS OF
GLOBAL POPULATIONS

Regardless of the relativity of war and peace, indigenous, tribal
and aboriginal populations have freely moved from one geographical
location to another. Indigenous peoples including the Nomadic tribes
have moved about, back and forth, and relocate in massive population transfer more or less freely of their own volition, in search for
better environments, milder climate, greater abundance ofwater and
food supplies or for any other reason. 32 As long as peoples live in a
social group or a community, there is always an opportunity to look
for a better place to farm, to fish, to hunt or to settle on more fertile
soil within friendlier or less hostile surroundings. This is a natural
phenomenon in demographic displacement. 33
When an indigenous population moves from its former habitat to
another location where there are no other former inhabitants, the
28. See The U.N. Transitory Authority for East Timor. See also Ntumy, "The Protection of the Ethnic autonomy of Kanaks in New Caledonia," 10 UCLA Pac. Basin L.
J. 376 (1992).
29. See Barsh, White Paper, supra n. 11; "... Africans consider themselves indigenous peoples who have achieved decolonization and self-determination".
30. ld. "Yet many relatively small nomadic herding and hunter-gatherer societies
such as the Thareg (Niger), Maasai (Kenya), Mbuti (Congo) and San (Southern Africa's Kalahari have been displaced and oppressed (internally colonized) by ethnically
unrelated African peoples who have been their neighbours for a thousand years and
longer".
31. See, for instance, a case note by Barnett, "Western Australia v. Ward: One
Step Forward and Two Steps Back: Native title and the Bundle of Rights Analysis,"
24 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 462 (2000).
32. See, for instance, Western Sahara Case 1975 ICJ Rep. 12 (Advisory opinion of
Oct. 16).
33. See, for instance, the Gulf of Fonseca Case, 1992 ICJ Rep. 351 (Sept. 11) between El Salvador and Honduras, Nicaragua intervening with the Court's permission.
The case related to earlier rights of "Indian poblaciones" and the settlement by the
1980 peace treaty ending the Soccer War of 1969.

12

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 50

original group does not lose its indigenous character, as it retains its
aboriginality in connection with the newfound territory which could
literally be regarded as "no man's land" or "terra nullius". 34 It could
also happen that one indigenous group moving out of its place of origin into a new territory may encounter yet another distinctive aboriginal group indigenous to that newly chosen territory. 35 Negotiations
could ensue, leading to an amiable settlement or an armed conflict or
confrontation could break out requiring resolution by means that
could be short of the use of force. 36
Apart from the movements of nomadic hill tribes and tribesmen
in the desert such as the Sahara, there have been massive movements of peoples indigenous to Asia and the Pacific, notably Chinese,
Indians, Mongolians, Iranians, Persians, Eskimos, Israelites, Malays
and Polynesians. 37 These ethnic groups are indigenous to their homelands but in their newfound land or island of their choice, they are
not indigenous. They are no longer aboriginal, but are visitors, immigrants or invited guests of the original native born groups. Clearly,
the Chinese in San Francisco or the Thais in Los Angeles are not
aboriginal, nor indigenous to California. They are nonetheless indigenous to China and Thailand respectively despite their becoming
Asian minorities or Californians. 38 In the United States, Chinese and
Thais are not indigenous and should not be treated as such, while
native Americans or American/Canadian Indians of various tribes
and denominations should be so treated with due respect to their cultural heritage and indigenous rights in the United States as to a
greater or lesser degree also in Canada. 39
As has been abundantly demonstrated, the relativity of "indigenousness" has been caused by the voluntary migration or movements
of populations from their place of origin or homelands to their new
places of adoption. The treatment of a single indigenous population,
such as the Chinese or overseas Chinese affords an interesting com34. The Eskimos, the Mongolians and the Alaskans moved about freely not only
in the northern region but also in the Pacific.
35. Pacific Islands, including Japanese, Taiwanese, Okinawan, etc., have received
many waves of visitors.
36. Southeast Asia has afforded fertile ground or Promised Land, land of opportunities for many immigrations from without. See also Kingsbury, "Indigenous People,
in International Law; A Constitutionist Approach to the Asian Controversy," 92
A.J.I.L 414 (1998).
37. There are overseas Chinese and overseas Indians, especially in Southeast
Asia and the Pacific from time immemorial.
38. Asians in the United States are classified, depending on the origin or the period, as Chinese, Pacific Islanders or simply Asians.
39. The term "Indians" have different meaning, depending on the usage. In the
Americas, it refers to Native Americans of various tribes. In Asia and Africa, it refers
to population indigenous to the Indian Subcontinent. The term "East Indies" and
"West Indies" refer to different ethnic groups. "East Indies" are Indonesian, Javanese,
Balinese, Sumatrans etc., while "West Indies" are the islanders in the Caribbean imported by England.
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parison or contrast from one country-study to another, from one legal
system to the next. As minorities, the Chinese are accorded certain
minorities rights in various states of the United States and Canada.
In Thailand, they have been assimilated in accordance with a national policy adopted by King Chulalongkorn almost a century and a
half ago with full rights and titles as Thai subjects, while maintaining their respective traditional ethnic Chinese ancestry. 40 In Malaysia, a new national policy of "Bhumi Putra", literally children of the
land, has been implemented with the result that non-native Bhumi
Putra without discrimination, Chinese or Indian alike, enjoy less
than the equal protection, equal rights and privileges accorded to Malay "Bhumi Putra". 41 The application of new laws and regulations regarding the protection of indigenous rights by the homeland itself
must be viewed and tested within a time-limit or a period of time
when the indigenous rights are recognized and protected by the home
state as against further encroachments by outsiders not only, as measures of self-protection but rather as the duty to preserve their indigenous heritage.
The above category of cases must be contrasted with the more
unenviable cases of Western expansionism in the new world, in Asia
and in Africa, especially in the societies where the surviving indigenous populations continue to subsist under the governance, if not
domination, of their uninvited European or Western intruders. 42 According to the voices of these indigenous peoples heard in the forums
of international human rights within the framework of the United
Nations, they would like to have their collective indigenous rights
recognized as such in the first place. 43 Secondly, they would like to
have their territorial rights restored and their land returned. 44
Thirdly, they would like to have their right to self-determination as
an autonomy or a self-government45 within the established community. Fourthly, they would like to have their legal status recognized
by the international community. 46 These are four of the initial concerns voiced by or on behalf of the indigenous peoples in the United
40. See part VII infra.
41. The precise definition of"Bhumi Putra" remains to be worked out through the
process of judicial interpretation, which increasingly is shifting from English to Malay
as the principal official language of the law and the courts.
42. See Roberts, supra n. 15.
43. Williams, "Encounters on the Frontier of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World," 1990 Duke L. J.
660 (1990).
44. See generally Morse, "Common Roots but Modern Divergencies: Aboriginal
policies in Canada and the United States," 10 St. Thomas L. Rev. 115 (1997).
45. See generally Suagee, "Human Rights of Indigenous People: Will the United
States Rise to the Occasion?," 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365 (1997).
46. See, for instance, the Indigenous Peoples' Seattle Declaration on the Occasion
of the Third Ministerial Meeting of the WTO November 30-December 3, 1999, available at, http://www.ldb.org/indi99.htm.
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States, Canada and Australia. It will be seen how step-by-step these
concerns have been or are being addressed in comparatively different
forms and measures in the three common-law systems concerned. 47

v.

INDIGENOUS RIGHTS AT THEIR BEST WHERE NATIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS MEET

If in the better known examples of the indigenous peoples in the
United States, Canada and Australia, their plights have received
public notice and national as well as international attention with a
remote chance of continuing gradual improvements of their lot, the
evolution of national positions appears to an appreciable extent to
have been prompted by the loud outcries from these vocal indigenous
populations themselves in national, regional and international forums.48 It should not be forgotten that international law, or the then
prevailing European generated law of nations, has provided some
fragile legal basis for the original deprivations of their pre-existing
inherent rights as independent sovereign nations and peoples. 49
By way of illustration, Chief Justice John Marshall in Johnson v.
M'lntosh (1823) 50 elaborated the doctrine that the invading European
acquired exclusive rights and control over the territories they discovered in spite of the subsisting occupation by the indigenous Native
Americans. Upon discovery, the sovereign rights of the indigenous
populations were necessarily curtailed 5 1 and their power to dispose of
the land at will was denied while their territories under their timehonored occupation were regarded as "terra nullius" or " no man's
land" open to usurpation and acquisition of new title by mere dispossession. Even for "terra nullius", Max Huber decided in the Island of
Palmas case 192852 that it could never be acquired by discovery
alone. Discovery merely gives an inchoate title which has to be followed up by effective occupation involving consistent and sustainable
display of sovereign authority. 5 3
47. See sections V and VI infra.
48. See generally Kaon-Cohen, "Native Justice in Australia, Canada and the
U.S.A.: A Comparative Analysis," 7 Monash U. L. Rev. 250 (1981).
49. See generally Bravo, "Balancing Rights to Land and the Demands of Economic Development: Lessons from the United States and Australia," 30 Colum. J. L.
& Soc. Prob. 529 (1997).
50. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 453 (1823). The dispute related to land purchased from the
Indian, now Illinois.
51. Id. at 272-74. The European discovery doctrine gave exclusive right and control to the European explorers over the land and the people occupying.
52. See Huber, "Sole Arbitrator in the Island of Palmas Case. U.S.A. v. Netherlands," P.C.A. (1928) 2 U.N. Rep. Int'l Arb. Awards 829.
53. See Robert Jennings, Acquisition of Territory in International Law (1963).
The Arbitrator Huber cited Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 4 U.S. 591 (U.S. 1845),
and Indiana v. Kentucky, 136 U.S. 479 (1890). See Jessup, 22 A.J.I.L. and Johnson,
"Constitution as a Root of Title in International Law," 1995 Cambridge L.J. 215
(1955).
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In Cherokee Nation v. Georgia (1831)5 4 Chief Justice Marshall,
relegating the status of American Indians to "domestic dependent nations", denied their standing to bring suit in aU. S. court, but would
advise the Indians to appeal to the tomahawk. 55 In the last case of
the Marshall trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia (1832) 56 some protection
was afforded to the Cherokees. The Supreme Court struck down the
Georgian statute designed to destroy the Cherokee's political community and possession of their land. Native Indian sovereignty was recognized and legal consent was required to extinguish native title of
the Indians. This decision appeared promising but in practice yielded
no positive results, since it lacked the executive power of
enforcement. 57
If Chief Justice Marshall had tried unsuccessfully to apply a
brake to the European doctrine of discovery by recognizing the existence of treaty rights conceded by the United States Government, the
United States Supreme Court in the last three decades has consistently upheld the absolute plenary power of the federal government
over Indian Affairs, including authorization to destroy Indian religious sites and practices, to suppress traditional forms of tribal government, forcibly to remove Indian children from their homes,
without payment of compensation to take resources, and to induce
involuntary sterilization of indigenous Indian women, among other
genocidal and ethnocidal ventures. 58
Stripped of all collective rights as indigenous populations without traditional territorial links, or any right of self-determination or
the slightest international legal status, native Americans in the
United States and in Canada have not been able to avail themselves
of their treaty rights on the ground that under international law indigenous parties were devoid of any treaty-making capacity attributable to independent sovereign nations and peoples. 59 The United
States and Canadian laws relying on Eurocentric international law
have failed to recognize the validity of treaties with native North
54. 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
55. Id. at 18.
56. 31 U.S. (5 Pet.) 515, 542, 543 (1832). Marshall refmed his characterization
and described the Indian tribe as "distinct peoples, divided into separate nations, independent of each other, and of the rest of the world, having institutions of their own
and governing themselves by their own laws."
57. The Worcester decision was never enforced, and the Cherokees were forced off
their land across the Mississippi. See Russell, "High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: The Limits of Judicial Independence," 61 Sask. L. Rev. 247,267 (1998), at
251-52.
58. See the United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 37 (1980) and the
Lone Wolf case, 187 U.S. at 568.
59. The Transfer of Indian Claims from the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) to
the Court of Claim in 1978 and no longer compensable hereunder. Unlike treaties
recognized in treaties and other agreements, native title was not compsenable under
the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment. 25 U.S.C § 70v (1978).
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American Indians as of any value beyond contracts of private law
character unenforceable against the unwilling authority of the political branch of the government. 60
The survival of the indigenous peoples of North America and the
continued subsistence of the aboriginal peoples of Australia would depend in large measures on the generosity and mercy of the prevailing
authorities of the European settlers. The political will to abide by the
national laws which could improve from total disregard of any indigenous rights to gradual recognition and readiness to implement some
of the measures in support of the indigenous heritage. 61 Further improvements on the national legal fronts will depend largely on positive progressive developments of international law setting general
minimum standards designed to preserve and protect the traditional
values and cultural heritage of the indigenous peoples. 62 It is possible
for international law to become more internationalized and better humanized in favour of the indigenous communities with the view, in
the ultimate analysis, to inducing more beneficial national legislation
to give effect to international aspirations. 63 The sooner the meeting
could be arranged between national and international legal doctrines, the happier will appear to be the indigenous populations on
this earth. The meeting or increased overlap between the international legal order and the various national legal systems will contribute to the improvement of the climate that fosters greater protection
of indigenous rights. 6 4

VI.

NATIONAL AccEPTANCE oF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS

A comparative study ofthe practice of Canada and ofthe United
States in a pair of parallel cases involving a claim or claims of indigenous Canadian and American Indian women to have their pre-marital indigenous status and rights restored will illustrate the relative
ease with which in Canada, where the possibility exists for individual
petition under the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights of 196665 and its Protocol, an aggrieved native Canadian
60. See Cross, "Sovereign Bargains, Indian Takings, and the preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-First Century," 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 425, 431 (1998), a shift
from an Indian 'trading' to an Indian 'raiding' strategy as a more sufficient means of
acquiring Indian Lands, at 455.
61. See Triggs, "Australia's Indigenous Peoples and International Law: Validity
of the Native Title Amendment Act, 1998," 23 Melbourne U. L. Rev. 372 (1999), and
supra n. 25.
62. See Anaya, "Indigenous Peoples, International Law Issues, 92 Proceedings of
the Annual Meeting," ASIL 96 (1998).
63. See Green, "Aboriginal Peoples, International law and the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedom," 16 Canadian Bar Review 113 (1982).
64. See generally Maritza Pena Guzman, "The Emerging System of International
Protection of Indigenous Peoples' Rights," 9 St. Thomas L. Rev. 251 (1996).
65. Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200 A (xxi), 21 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 16) at 52,
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) 999 UNTS 171 entered into force March 23 1976.
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American Indian could successfully vindicate her indigenous rights.
Once the home State is willing to accept international standards, effective ways and means can be found through the U.N. Human
Rights Committee to have her complaint against discrimination
based on gender heard and resolved.
Thus, in Lovelace v. Canada (1981), 66 Sandra Lovelace submitted a communication, stating that she was a 32 year-old-woman, living in Canada, born and registered as "Maliseet Indian" but has lost
her rights and status as an Indian in accordance with section 12 (1)
(b) ofthe Indian Act of Canada, after having married a non-Indian on
23 May 1970. However, an Indian man marrying a non-Indian woman does not lose his Indian status. The Indian Act therefore violates
article 2 (1), 3, 23 (1) and (4), 26 and 27 of the Covenant of 1966. In its
submission, Canada the State party recognized that "many of the
provisions of the Indian Act, including section 12(1) (b) require serious reconsideration and reform. The Committee observed that Canada had undertaken under Article 2(1) and (2) of the Covenant to
respect and ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject
to its jurisdiction, the rights recognized in the Covenant without distinction of any kind such as gender, and to adopt the necessary measures to give effect to these rights." The Committee further observed
that "the major loss to a person ceasing to be an Indian is the loss of
the cultural benefits of having Indian Community, the emotional ties
to home, family, friends and neighbours, and the loss of identity."67
Accordingly, the Committee acting under Article 5(4) of the Optional
Protocol is of the view that the facts of the present case, which establish that Sandra Lovelace has been denied the legal right to reside in
the Tobique Reserve, disclose a breach by Canada of article 27 of the
Covenant. 68 On July 28, 1985 the Indian Act amendment (S.C. 1985,
C. 27) came into force in Canada. The amended Act omitted section
12(1) (b), which prescribed that Indian women marrying non-Indian
lose their Indian status. It allowed registration oflndians who previously lost their Indian status under the repealed section of the Indian
Act. As a result of the amendment, 24,000 persons regained indige-

66. See Communication No. 24/1977 by Sandra Lovelace on 29 December 1977
and Views by the Human Rights Committee on 30 July 1981 (thirteenth session),
Report of the HRC, 36 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No.40) at 166, U.N. Doc. at 36/40 (1981).
67. See Lovelace case as reported and commented in Frank Newman and David
Weissbrodt, "Intemational Human Rights," second printing Aug. 1991. pp. 75-84.
68. Article 27 provides: "In these States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in
communities with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, and to
practice their religion, or to use their own language.
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nous rights and Indian Status. 69 This amendment also served to
avoid violating section 15(1) of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 70
A way was found and a means adopted for Canada to right the
wrongs suffered by 24,000 married Indian women whose indigenous
status has since been resuscitated. 71 Without the U.N. Human
Rights Committee as a body responsible for hearing communications
and stating its views, and without the good faith and willingness of
the Canadian Government to accept international standards, the
plight of the 24,000 married Indian women in Canada would have
remained unattended let alone resolved. 72
The Canadian case of Sandra Lovelace is to be contrasted with
the U.S. case of Martinez in Martinez v. Santa Clara Pueblo (1976). 73
This case concerned the validity of a membership ordinance of Santa
Clara Pueblo in New Mexico. The appellants are female members of
the Pueblo who, not unlike Lovelace in Canada, are married to nonmembers, together with their children. The ordinance grants membership of the Pueblo to "all children born of marriages between male
members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members" but precludes
membership for "children born of marriages between female members of the Santa Clara Pueblo and non-members" 74 In the Trial
Court the decision was in favour of the defendants. 75 The Supreme
Court in 1978 reversed the lOth Circuit, declining jurisdiction over
complaints under the Indian Civil Rights Act (25 U.S.C. § 1302) and
dismissed the case without discussing the merits, 76 except finding in
the legislative history a desire to protect Indian self-determination.
The Supreme Court reasoned that Congress intended that such suits
be heard in tribal fora that are better suited to evaluate questions of
tribal tradition, 77 thereby abdicating its responsibilities to promote
69. See Opekokew, "Self-Identification and Culture Preservation: A Commentary
on Recent Indian Act Amendments," 2 Canadian National Rep. 1, 2-5 (1986).
70. See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, 1981, section 15(1), 27 and 28.
71. Although Lovelace case was an individual petition under article 5(4) of the
Optional Protocol. the views of the Committee not only prompted the adoption of the
1985 Amendment but also enabled the registration of24,000 Indians otherwise previously deprived of their Indian status.
72. Compare and contrast the Martinez case in paragraph 33 below. Compare
also the decision of U.N. CERD regarding Australia's violation oflnternational obligations in regard to the Amended Native Title Act, 1998 (18 March 1999). See also
paragraph 34 of the Alfonso Martinez Report, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2000/24, p. 9 in supra n.
2.
73. See Doyle, Circuit Judge 540 F. 2d. 1039 (lOth Cir. 1976).
74. Appellants alleged that the ordinance contravenes the equal right protection
and due process provisions of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, 25 U.S.C. Section
1302(8).
75. 402 F. Supp. 5 (D.N.M. 1975)
76. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
77. See Justice Doyle in the lOth Circuit, 540 F. 2d 1039 (1996): "In sum, if they
were to approve the ordinance and in turn approve this plain discrimination, it would
be tantamount to saying that the Indian Bill of Rights is merely an abstract statement of principle.
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equal protection to female members of Santa Clara Pueblo marrying
non-members and their offsprings. The children of Julie and Myles
Martinez are 100 percent Indian and 50 percent Santa Claran, speaking the language of the Santa Clara Pueblo, namely Tewa. They practice the customs of the tribe and are accepted into the tribe's religion.
Nevertheless, membership is denied and they stand to be excluded
from the band with the right of inheritance, residency and voting,
solely because their mother rather than their father is a Santa
Claran. 78 Had this occurred in Canada, or in the United States after
the latter's ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the acceptance of the U.S. Government of international
standards could provide a positive solution, notwithstanding the effect or absence thereof of the U.S. ratification of the Covenant. 79 The
equal protection clause of the U.S. Constitution and the U.S. acceptance of international standards of non-discrimination based on gender might supersede, if not override any suggestion of the supremacy
or unquestionable validity of the ordinance of an otherwise autonomous indigenous community. 80
VII.

THE RoLE OF THE JuDICIARY IN THE MEANINGFUL

INTERPRETATION AND EFFECTIVE IMPLEMENTATION OF
PROGRESSIVE NATIONAL LEGISLATION

The United Nations proclaimed 199381 the International Year of
the World's Indigenous Peoples and the General Assembly had earlier ushered in the International Decade of the World's Indigenous
Peoples for 1990-2000. 82 An interesting comparative analysis can be
made of progressive legal developments in the United States and
Australia in respect of the treatment of Native titles and the indigenous peoples' right to land. In this connection, the judiciary in each of
the countries under review may be said to have played a decisive role,
reflecting its willing determination or reluctance to give effect to national legislation and to provide a meaningful interpretation to its
revealing provisions.
78. Id. The Circuit Judge did not think that the Fourteenth Amendment standards of equal protection, however, apply with full force. They do nevertheless serve
as persuasive guide to the decision. The Indian Bill of Rights is modeled after the
Constitution of the United States and is to be interpreted in the light of Constitutional Law decisions.
79. See Shelton, "International Law," in U.S. Ratification of the International
Covenant on Human Rights, 27, 29-33 (Hurst Hannum & Dana D. Fischer ed., 1993).
80. In any event, the U.S. Senate's advice and consent is subject to the Declaration that the provisions of Article 1 through 27 of the Covenant are not self-executing.
138 Cong. Rec. S 4781-01 (daily ed., April 2, 1992).
81. G.A. Res. 51178, U.N. Doc. A/Res/51178 (1997). See Amy Sender, Australia Example of Treatment Towards Native Title: Indigenous People's Land Rights in Australia and the United States.
82. G.A. Res. 45/164, U.N. Doc A/Res/45/164 (1991).

20

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 50

The theory of "terra nullius" was applied by the British and subsequently by the United States Supreme Court in as early as 1823 in
Johnson v. M'Intosh. 83 England proclaimed Australia as British territory in 178884 and successively expanded the doctrine of "terra nullius" to later annexations such as the Murray Islands in 187985 at the
expense of the original inhabitants under the pretext that the primitive aboriginal population did not display any evidence of clearly
identifiable laws and definitive titles to land. 86 Thus, the adoption of
Pacific Islander Acts, 187287 and 1875 88 made no provision for the
continued existence of native titles. As late as 1971, in Milirrpum v.
Nabalco Pty. Ltd., 89 the Yirrkala aborigines ofthe Gove Peninsula in
the Northern territory of Australia were denied judicial recognition of
their right to stop bauxite mining taking place on their land and no
compensatory damages were awarded, Justice Blackburn holding
that Australia did not recognize communal native title, the Yirrkala
aborigines did not have continual connection to the land since 1788
and that their relationship did not create a proprietary right. 90
A significant change of judicial position took place in Mabo v.
Queensland (1992) 91 after ten years of litigation, the High Court of
Australia in a 6 to 1 decision overruled Justice Blackburn's decision
in Milirrpum case, 92 in effect, recognizing native title. This decision
is of general application and is not limited to the Meriam Aborigines
in the Murray Islands, and that aboriginal and indigenous rights and
titles survived annexation which did not operate to extinguish their
claims. This case is a clear precedent for the biological descendents of
the aboriginal inhabitants of the Murray Islands who maintained
their customs and traditions. Other aboriginal groups might encounter other obstacles in the presentation of their respective claims. To
put the treatment of aboriginal rights on a more clearly ascertainable
basis, Australia passed the Native Title Act of 1993 93 to validate all
83. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 534 (1823).
84. See Bravo, "Balancing Indigenous Rights to Land and the Demands of Economic Development, Lessons from the United States and Australia," 30 Colum. J. L.
& Soc. Probs. 529, 531 (1997).
85. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 1, 10.
86. See Manwaring, "Recent Development," 34 Harv. Int'l. L. J. 177, 177 n. 1
(1993). Indeed, such aboriginal inhabitants were not of a sufficient level of civilization
to "own" the land effectively, or that the territory is practically unoccupied. See Mabo,
107 A.L.R. at 4.
87. 35 & 36 Viet. Ch. 19 (Eng.).
88. 38 & 39 Viet. Ch. 51 (Eng.).
89. (1971) 17 F.L.R. 141 (Austl.).
90. See Mabo, 107 A.L.R. at 77.
91. (1992) 107 A.L.R. 1 (Austl.). Since Australia's acceptance of the Protocol, the
U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has been invoked and may continue to be invoked by Australian indigenous tribes against the
Australian Government for violation of international treaty obligation.
92. See supra n. 89.
93. See Native Title Act, §15(1)(b)(ii), §26-42, and §107-110.
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prior acts where native titles were under sole ownership of non-natives. Thus, claimants are not entitled to compensation if their title
was extinguished after the Commonwealth's Racial Discrimination
Act of 197 594 as long as proof was furnished of their connection with
the land at annexation. A National Native Title Tribunal was created
to serve as a mediating body to hear and process native title claims
and fund programs to assist disputes over native titles. Although
comprehensive, the National Native Title Act did not address the
question of pastoral leases. The High Court in Wik People v. Queensland (1996) 95 in a 4 to 3 decision ruled in favor of the aborigines Wik
and Thayorre Peoples and held that the pastoral leases did not extinguish their native title. In 1994, 96 the High Court of Australia was
called upon by Western Australia to give a ruling on the constitutionality of the National Native Title Act 1993. Its constitutionality was
upheld, finding a general power within the "races power" section of
the Australian Constitution. 97 Despite the comprehensiveness of the
Act and the willingness of the High Court of Australia to uphold in
general the native titles and benefits in favor of aboriginal peoples,
one section of the Act, section 12 was struck down "for attempting to
convey legislative power upon the judicial branch ofthe government,"
by providing that "subject to this Act, the common law of Australia in
respect of native title has after 30 June 1993, the force of a law of the
Commonwealth." 9 8
If the Australian Judiciary appears to be willing to recognize the
rights of the Aborigines almost to the extent of usurping the power of
the legislature, it has recognized the Constitutional Supremacy of
Parliament as an echo of the English doctrine of Parliamentary
Supremacy, the United States Supreme Court cannot be said to be
subject to such constitutional constraint. In reality, the United States
Courts have been much freer and completely unrestrained in their
role as interpreter of United States Constitution and federal legislation. As seen in the Marshall trilogy of judicial decisions, 99 the U.S.
Supreme Court was willing to recognize some indigenous states for
Native Americans and their native title. On the legislative front, the
battles have not been decisive. As early as 1790, Congress promul94. See Racial Discrimination Act, 1975, ch. 52 (Austl.), esp. § 9(1). See, however,
Miller, "Comment, An Australian Nunavut: A Comparison of Inuit and Aboriginal
Rights Movements in Canada and Australia," 12 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 1175, 1195
(1998). The Act could hardly be expected to bring racial discrimination to an automatic end.
95. (1996) 141 A.L.R. 129 (Austl.).
96. Westem Australia v. Commonwealth (1995) 128 A.L.R. 1,3 (Austl.).
97. Id. at 43-45 and at 62-65. See also U.N. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination Finding the Native Title Amendment Act, 1998 discriminates
against Australian Indigenous land titleholders.
98. See Native Title Act, 1993, ch. 110 S. 12. See Westem Australia case in 128
A.L.R. 1, 3 (Austl.) at 43-44 and at 62-65.
99. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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gated authority and prohibited unauthorized trade with Indians, 100
followed by the period of the "reservation era" to force Indian out of
their settled area onto confined reservations.l 01 In 1871, Congress
terminated treaty-making with Indians 102 without abrogating existing treaties. The General Allotment Act (1887) broke up the land
held communally by Native Americans into farming and ranching. 103
Finally, Congress set a program distributing the excess land to nonIndian settlers, thereby reducing the land held by indigenous Indians
from 138 million acres in 1877 to 48 million acres in 1934. 104
The Supreme Court in the Lone Wolf case (1924) 105 denied injunctive relief requested by the Kiowa and Commanche tribes for violation of Article 12 of the Treaty of Medicine Lodge Creek 106 in 1946,
the Indian Claims Commission (ICC) was established to process and
evaluate the Native American claims against the U.S. Government.
The ICC was terminated in 1978, leaving the remaining cases unheard and as the claims became non-compensable under the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims. 107 In 1955, the Tee-Hit-Ton Indians of
Alaska unsuccessfully brought suit against the government to recover compensation for the timber taken from their land.l 08 The Supreme Court reaffirmed that Native Americans' rights to native title
were not constitutionally protected property rights and could be extinguished.109 The Supreme Court in United States v. Sioux Nation of
Indians (1980) 110 extended further the government control over Indians. The shift was from "good faith" to " good faith effort", and the
test was exclusively on the legitimacy of the government in its exer100. See the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, 33 Stat. 137 (1790) repealed in
1793.
101. See the Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, ch. 161, 4 Stat. 729 (1834), See Act
of March 3, 1871, ch. 120, 16 Stat. 544 (codified and amended 25 U.S. C. § 71 (1994):
hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within the territory of the United States shall be
acknowledged as an independent nation, tribe or power with whom the United States
may contract by treaty. Id. at 566.
102. See Act of March 3, 1871, ch 120, 16 Stat. 544 (1871), See Cross, "Sovereign
Bargains, Indian Takings and the Preservation of Indian Country in the Twenty-first
Century," 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 425, 431 (1998).
103. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
104. In June 1996, a class action suit was brought by over 300,000 Native Americans alleging mishandling of allotment of land by the federal government from the
1887 General Allotment Act. Cobell v. Babbit, 30 F. Supp. 2d. 24 (D.D.C. 1998), and
North Cir. 96-1285, 1999 WL. 607188 at 21 (D.D.C. Aug. 10, 1999).
105. Lone Wolfv. Hitchcock 187 U.S. 553, at 568 (1903).
106. Article 12 of the Treaty requires the consent of three-fourth of the adult males
of the Kiowa and Commanche tribes before their land could be taken, Oct. 21, 1867,
Articles 12, 15 Stat. 581, 585.
107. 25 U.S.C. § 70v (1978). Only Indian tribes and not individuals were entitled to
bring claims before the ICC.
108. 348 U.S. 272 (1955).
109. Id. at 287-88 and 290.
110. 448 u.s. 371 (1980).
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cise of plenary power over the Indian land, regardless of the economic
losses and hardships suffered by Native Americans.U 1
The future of Native American titles to land appears bleak, in
the light of the composition of the current Supreme Court, which appears to be lacking in enthusiasm if indeed not total absence of interest in cases involving native Americans. Native Americans currently
exist, like Australian Aborigines, with distinct and independent cultures, with their own customs, traditions, languages, religions and
government. But unlike Australia, the United States does not exhibit
the same keen sense of political awareness of the need to protect the
property rights of indigenous Americans. Lacking the political will
within the judicial branch of the government, which is supreme in the
United States, very little or nothing by way of positive progressive
developments could be expected in the foreseeable future, barring
any fundamental change of circumstances bordering a miracle. 112
It is difficult at this juncture to assess the future status of Native
Americans in regard to native title given the lack of the political will
on the part of the judiciary to champion the cause of freedom for all
without distinction as to races, religions, culture, etc. Comparing recent statistics, Australian Aborigines today have potential claims to
seventy-nine percent of Australia's land, 113 ten years ago their ownership claims were only fourteen percent. 114 One author comments
that the Indians' reliance on the "white man's court" to adjudicate
their rights "blunted the capacity" of America's Indigenous peoples
for more autonomous form of political action and prevented aboriginal issues from becoming as prominent on U.S. political agenda as
they now are in Australia, Canada and New Zealand.l 15 Nor have
legal developments in the United States in the field of cultural and
religious self-determination been particularly encouraging, having
regard to the historical picture of the Christianization efforts and the
suppression of indigenous religious ceremonies. 116 Twentieth-century
efforts to vindicate religious rights have not been noteworthy in spite
of express provisions in the United States Constitution protecting the
111. Id. at 407-17. Under Federal Indian Policy, "plenary power" means a) exclusive, b) preemptive, and c) unlimited power of congress over the Indians, including
their lands and resources.
112. See Getches, "Conquering the Cultural Frontiers: The New Subjectivism of
the Supreme Court in Indian Law," 84 Cal. L. Rev. 1573, 1631 (1996); Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Stevens appear more disposed to show a serious interest in
this area. The willingness of the Supreme Court to provide protection of indigenous
interests will be crucial.
113. See Rodriguez, "Note," 23 N.C.J. Int'l. L. & Com. Reg. 711, 727 (1998).
114. Id. at 711.
115. See Russel, "High Courts and the Rights of Aboriginal Peoples: The Limits of
Judicial Independence," 61 Sask. L. Rev. 247, 267 (1998), at 254.
116. See Dussias, "The Rights to Cultural and Religious Self-Determination: Lessons from the Experience of Native Americans," 2 ILSA J. Int'l & Camp. L. 633-41
(1996).
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right to free exercise of religion and the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978 (AIRFA).l 17 There is a remote possibility that
Native American free exercise claimants may find some relief in future cases under the terms of the Religious Freedom Restructure Act
(RFRA) of 1993 118 as a partial response to the Supreme Court decision in Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.ll 9 The 1994 Amendments to AIRFA to ensure
lawfulness, under the State and federal law of the ceremonial use of
peyote by tribal members 120 may afford limited protection to the
practice of a certain tribal religious ceremony.
One area where progress may be expected in the not too distant
future is the process of consultation within the inter-governmental
relations committee of the United States on such important matters
as the U.N. Draft Declaration on the Rights oflndigenous Peoples. 121
This practice should be encouraged and the Native Indians of all
tribes should be encouraged to participate in the consultation process. It is nonetheless too early to assess the effectiveness of the consultative process. 122

VIII.

THE STATUS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN AND
OUTsiDE THEIR HoMELANDS

In the preceding section an examination has been made of the
status of indigenous peoples who have been subjected to Western invasion and colonization and as a consequence suffered the fate of being the victims of invaders' legal regime in their own birthplace. For
the Native American Indians in the North and South American Continents, in the United States, Canada, Mexico, 123 Peru, 124 Brazil, 125
117. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 (1994); See in particular Lyng v. Northwest Indian Country
Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1998) at 453.
118. 42 U.S.C. § 2000 bb-1 to 2000 bb-4 (1994).
119. 494 U.S. 872, at 889-890.
120. 42 U.S.C. § 1996 a (b)(l) (1994).
121. See, for instance, The Report of the Inter-governmental Relations Committee
on Navajo Native Delegation to the Working Group of the U.N. Commission on
Human Rights Sixth Session, Geneva, Switzerland, Sept. 6, 2000.
122. A study published in the Annual Survey of Int'l and Comparative Law of
Golden Gate University recommends that the U.N. allows Iroquois, Cherokee, Navajo, Seminole, and other tribes membership into the United Nations. Some 166,000
Navajos, 43,000 Cherokees and other Indians own more than 96 million acres ofland
in the United States.
123. See Roberts, "The Protection oflndigenous Populations' Cultural Property in
Peru, Mexico, and the United States," 4 Tulsa J. Int'l L., 327 (1997). The United
States, Mexico and Peru have become parties to the UNESCO Convention on the
Means of Protecting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Ownership of Cultural Property, 1970. 1860 U.N.T.S. 234-236: Cultural property is defmed as "property which, on religious or secular grounds, is specially designated by each State as
being of importance for archeology, pre-history, history, literature, art or science".
124. Id. See also John E. Conkline, Art Crime 187-88, at 280 (1994).
125. See Suagee, "Human Rights oflndigenous People: Will the United States Rise
to the Occasion?," 21 Am. Indian L. Rev. 365 (1997).
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and Ecuador, 126 or indeed for the restoration of indigenous rights of
the aboriginal populations of Australia and the Maoris in New Zealand, 127 their sufferings have been practically prototype, their status
non-existent, their right of access to courts negligible 128 and legal
remedies inconsiderable. 129 The problems to be addressed in this section concern other regions of the world, where the indigenous or aboriginal populations have continued to coexist and to maintain their
distinctive traditional, religious, linguistic and cultural existence
within an autonomous, independent sovereign national entity, and
universally recognized as such for all times. These indigenous peoples include the Thais, the Chinese and to and appreciable extent the
Japanese. Within a long span of time frame, the Thais and the Chinese who are indigenous to East and Southeast Asia, have managed
to maintain their distinctive cultures and traditions as well as their
continuous political independence, The Japanese have had a much
later start and had to contend with pre-existing aborigines and indigenous islanders before their settlement in the main islands of Japan.
It is of interest to compare the experience of the Thais with that of
the Chinese in their original homelands and the treatment each people received as overseas residents. The Sino-Thai comparison provides an interesting contrast.
A.

Indigenous and Overseas Chinese

The Chinese indigenous populations took millennia and centuries to consolidate the unification of their homeland which is China
today through various dynasties and revolutions, including the latest
cultural revolution. The different groups of war lords divided and
ruled various regions and provinces of China for many long years. All
through its national history, China has absorbed within the Celestial
Empire countless ethnic Asian and Southeast Asian minorities,
among them the Tibetans, the Thais in Yunnan Province (at one time
Thai Autonomous State), the Manchus and various Chinese ethnic
groups, Cantonese, Taechiew, Hainannese, Hakka, Fukinese,
Hunannese, Szechwan, etc. It may be said that today the Chinese
indigenous peoples themselves are in power determining their own
destinies and not subject to any alien domination or occupation, except for one whole century, China persevered under the regime of
126. See Lopez Bermudez, "Indigenous Peoples and International Law: The Case
of Ecuador," St. Thomas L. Rev. Fall (1997).
127. See McHugh, "The Constitutional Role of the Waitangi Tribunal," 3 N.Z.L.
Journal 224 (1985). See also Quentin-Baxter, "The U.N. Draft Declaration on the
Rights of Indigenous Peoples - The International and Constitutional Law Contexts,"
29 Victoria U. of Wellington L. R. 85 (1999).
128. See e.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978).
129. Or indeed unheeded as in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
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western extraterritoriality or what the Chinese labeled "unequal
treaties".
Within China itself, the Chinese are indigenous and can assert
their rights under their own constitution arid existing legal regime,
affording some measure of protection of the rights of the individuals
as a general aspect of human rights rather than the rights of indigenous peoples. However, overseas Chinese, in a way not dissimilar
from Indians from Asia, have become minorities in various regions
and countries of the world. As members of minorities groups, the
rights of overseas Chinese have not always been consistently recognized. For instance, in Thailand, peoples of Chinese descent have
long been accepted as assimilated Thais with all the rights and obligations of Thai subjects. They are nevertheless allowed large freedoms to practice their own religions: Confucianism, Buddhism,
Taoism, Animism, etc., and to speak and write their own Chinese dialects, subject to one proviso only. No additional Chinese schools or
schools in which the medium of teaching is Chinese would be allowed,
the Thai Government policy of containing the Chinese or defending
indigenous Thai cultures has tolerated no further expansion of Chinese linguistic imperialism. The results have been salutary. The second and third generation Chinese are more conversant with Thai
literature than they are at home with Chinese, thus preventing or
pre-empting reverse assimilation in cultural transformation. The assimilation policy of the Thai Government has left the cultural traditions of the Chinese virtually intact, while, legally speaking the Thais
of Chinese ancestry suffer no social inferiority, nor political
disabilities.
The treatment of Overseas Chinese in other countries in Asia
have not been as benevolent to the Chinese. In Jap:;tn, the Chinese
communities minorities sticking together in Yokohama and a handful
of other townships, while the use of Kanji in Japanese language has
not served as a link to accelerate the assimilation process, one way or
another. In other parts of Asia, Chinese minorities are not accorded
the most favorable treatment. Outside Asia, in Europe and the
United States, "affirmative actions" mean for Chinese, as they do for
most Asians, that to survive the Chinese as much as other Asian
counterparts have to perform twice or three times better to be accepted as equals. Overseas Chinese and Asian Indians in South Africa, for instance, during the Apartheid regime were separated from
Whites and native Africans. Even the legislature had three component parts, according to the colour of their complexion.
B.

Thais in Thailand and Other Native Lands

The Tais or Thais and Chinese are indigenous to East Asian and
Southeast Asian regions that for millennia have overlapped. Inevita-
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bly, both have endured the co-existence that has been intermittently
peaceful. The Thais were at one time moving southwards from the
Yangtse Valley into the Golden Penninsula, split into countless Thai
Kingdoms; Nan Chao, Lanna, Lanchang, Shan State, Twelve Panna,
Twelve Chu Thai, Saen Wee, Payao, Chieng Mai, Sukhothai,
Lopburi, Ayudhaya, Laos, Dien Bien Phu, Assam etc. The main
stream little Thais settled in what is known as Thailand today, while
other ethnic Thais, including Black Thais and Big Thais, remain in
Northern Myanmar, East India and Northern Vietnam. Nanchao
kingdom surrendered to one of the three Chinese Kingdoms. Beng
Hek annexed Yunnan more than a thousand years ago. 130
The original Thais in today's Thailand have maintained political
independence, sacrificing its outlying tributary provinces to Western
colonial powers. As indigenous, the Thais have had to hold their own,
and their ground. If Thailand were as large as China and as populous, it would have been less difficult. But with fewer populations and
more limited territorial domain, Thailand has succeeded in warding
off several waves of Western expansion.l 31 Thus, the problem for the
Thais as aborigines and indigenous to the homeland has been how to
defend it and how to survive against all odds with distinctive cultures, language and civilization dating back to over 5,000 years of
continuous existence.
The problems encountered by indigenous Thais outside Thailand
are worth noting. In Yunnan, the Thais received no special treatment
as minorities. They were long required to learn Chinese and be assimilated. Yet, through centuries, they managed to maintain their
distinct identities as Thais, preserving Thai language, cultures and
traditions. During the height of the cold war, Yunnan or formerly
Nanchao was upgraded as a Thai Autonomous State, in preparation,
as it were, for reunification with the Kingdom of Thailand under Chinese hegemony. Today, the cold war is history and The People's Republic of China is collaborating with its neighbor to the south in more
than one way, not least of which is to make Kunming, the capital of
Yunnan, a place of touristic attraction for Thai visitors, thereby reducing the tension and pre-empting potential conflicts between the
two countries.
Indigenous Thais in other Southeast Asian countries are minorities, except perhaps in Laos where they are integrated majorities, as
the Thais and the Laotains are really indistinguishable as Thai-Lao
or Siam-Lao ethnic groups. In Shan State, they are minorities of Myanmar and await separation or settlement as their internal political
status improves. The Thai-Ahoms in Assam and the Black Thais in
130. See W.A.R. Wood, A History of Siam (1924); and Rong Sayamananda, A History of Thailand, Chulalongkorn (1976).
131. Id.

28

THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LAW

[Vol. 50

Vietnam are integral part of ethnic Thai minorities. Their rights as
minorities groups depend on the particular legal systems under
which they find themselves.
Within the territory of Thailand today, apart from Chinese minorities, assimilated Chinese Thais and Thai Muslims in the four
Southern provinces, in the North and in the central plain, there live
several indigenous tribal communities and nomadic hill tribes, such
as the Mon-Khmer, the Maew, the Mong, the Karens, the Kachin, the
Lasu and rarely the Southern Negritos. Central Government policies
towards non-Thai indigenous ethnic minorities have varied from time
to time. Currently, freedom of opinion and thought, including freedom of religion and worship seems to be prevailing with the result
that secessionist and separatist movements in the South and the
Northeast appear to have provisionally subsided. If all the indigenous
populations of Thailand who are non-Thai and non-Buddhist can feel
socially integrated in a pluralistic society, relative peace and stability
will continue to reign. Problems of social and cultural importance exist, however, with regard to a number of "montagnards" or "hill
tribes", who move from hillside to another, cutting timber and cultivating opium. Royal projects have been launched with some measure
of success to integrate these various ethnic hill tribes.
Other frontier problems relate to the influx of political and economic "refugees" from neighboring countries, Myanmar, Laos,
Kampuchea, and Vietnam. These uninvited neighbors are treated as
displaced persons or illegal immigrants, and only in exceptional cases
where they are sponsored by the Office of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees that they are given additional protection.
Thailand could not afford to accord all displaced persons the status of
"refugees". They are nonetheless indigenous populations of countries
adjacent to the Kingdom and include identifiable ethnic groups with
existing counterparts in Thailand. Economic and social difficulties
notwithstanding, Thailand has agreed to abide by the principle of
"non-refoulement", meaning non-repatriation at the frontier. The displaced persons can be admitted into the Kingdom as the country of
first refuge, whence they could strive to seek more permanent residence or asylum elsewhere. Such is the plight of various "refugees"
who cannot return to their homelands until peace, calm and harmony
can be restored.
IX.

THE STATUS OF DECOLONIZED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN
THEIR NATIVE LANDS

A survey of this nature cannot be complete without reference to
the status of countless groups of indigenous populations whose fatherland has been decolonized, but other tribal chiefs have taken the
control of the lands once unified under colonial domination. Not un-
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like the richly populated subcontinent ofBarata (India), the ethnicity
of Nigeria is so vastly divergent that there is no precise definition of
Nigeria apart from the geographical location or limits within which
Nigeria is situated.132
The word "tribe" is hardly appropriate to describe these Nigerian
ethnic groups. The Ibo or Igbo and Hausa-Fulani are five to ten million strong for each group. The majority groups consist of the Yoruba
and the above two groups. The Hausa-Fulani are made up oftwo subgroups, the Rausa and the Fulani. In November 1990, an Ogoni Bill
of Rights was presented to the Government and People of Nigeria,
claiming as the people of Ogoni (Babbe, Gokana, Ken Khana, Nyo
Khana and Tai) numbering about half a million people, being a separate and distinct ethnic nationality within the Federal Republic of
Nigeria, that in pre-British colonial days they were not conquered or
colonized by any other ethnic groups in present day Nigeria. Their
complaints related specially to the mining of the Ogoni land in various oil fields providing resources of over 30 billion U.S. dollars from
which the Ogoni, who owned the land to which they were indigenous
received nothing in return. The Ogoni people have no representation,
no pipe-borne water, no electricity, no job opportunity and no social or
economic development project of the Federal Government. 133
Like most indigenous peoples who have been colonized and ultimately liberated, the Ogoni people seek political autonomy, a notion
of self-determination, to participate in the affairs of the Republic as a
distinct and separate unit. In particular, the Ogoni seek direct representation in all Nigerian national institutions, the use and development of Ogoni language in Ogoni territory and the rights to religious
freedom as well as the right to protect the Ogoni environment and
ecology from further degradation. In other words, the Ogoni are seeking equal protection and equal treatment as any other ethnic group,
equally indigenous to the land within the Republic. The basic issues
of the Ogoni case may be summarized to include: (1) their participation in the making of decisions that affect them; (2) the need for improved attention to the development of minority tribes that account
for the wealth ofthe nation; (3) the need to balance economic benefits;
(4) the need for the government to exercise restraint in clamping
down on Ogoni protests in their demand for increased attention or
some basic principles of self-determination; and (5) the recognition
and respect for human rights by the Federal Government when dealing with them.

132. See Simon A. Rakov, Vassar College '92 (English 32, Fall1990). Ethnicity in
Nigeria African Postcolonial, in English, in the Postcolonial Web.
133. See The Ogoni Bill of Rights, November 1990, available at http://dawodu.net/
ogonibillofrights.
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Not unlike other indigenous ethnic groups in newly independent
countries, the national government is called upon to provide equal
care and protection to all peoples, minorities or indigenous, or aborigines or otherwise labeled. The possibility of equitable distribution of
wealth depends on the political will of the entire population as well as
the farsightedness of the government in power.
X.

CoNCLUSIONS

The preceding survey of selected practice in a handful of legal
systems can scarcely afford a solid basis for any conclusive report.
Suffice it merely to expose comparativists to a far wider spectrum of
problems encountered by indigenous populations the world over, 134
and not confined to the profusion of literature based on Eurocentric
experience to redeem the effect of ethnocidal and genocidal measures.
No amount of legal or constitutional provisions or safeguards could
ensure the actual enjoyment of indigenous rights. Several Westernstyle bureaucratic and administrative obstacles have stood in the
way of fruitful implementation of the principles ofbasic freedoms and
fundamental human rights for the indigenous peoples as a collectivity of populations with their distinctive cultural, linguistic, religious
and other heritage. It should not be forgotten that indigenous rights
are collective as well as individual human rights, and that all human
rights entail obligations on the part of the States, at least within
their territorial jurisdiction and/or control.
Access to court is a minimum standard, but to what avail if there
is no favourable applicable law in place nor willing judges freely to
give effect to updated beneficial legal provisions. The decision in
Worcester v. Georgia is reminiscent of the need for the willingness on
the part of all the agencies, notably the executive branch of the government to enforce the law and judicial decision properly rendered
after careful judicial deliberation and formulation.
A sound policy at the national level in favour of the indigenous
peoples is indispensable to their survival as distinct and separate but
equal ethnic groups. More significant than government policy is the
growing consciousness on the part of the bulk of the population represented on the central government, who may feel the urge to share a
more liberal outlook. It is the psychology of the mass that deserves a
higher level of education to be free from pre-existing bias and
prejudices based on ignorance and human greed, and to tolerate and
appreciate the existence of the world outside the one in which we live.
After all, globalization does not mean the imposition of our world on
the outside world. Rather a search should be made better to under134. See the trail-blazer in a White Paper by Russel Barsh, in supra n. 11; and the
Report of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, presented by Miguel Alfonso
Martinez, President-Rapporteur at the close of the decade, supra n. 2.
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stand the world around us. While the caste system was long abolished under the Indian Constitution, the existence of class distinction
still lingers on. One of the lessons that can be learned from this cursory exercise is the apparent potentiality of international efforts
which can be orchestrated to substantiate and nourish the common
hope for the survival with honour of every living thing on earth, every
species of breathing being, a human being, be it or not part and parcel of an indigenous people or aborigines or immigrants or otherwise.
If persons are equal individually, they should also receive the same
respect and the same treatment collectively as distinct ethnic groups.
All things considered and with a balanced approach, every one, every
nation, every State should rally in unison to come to rescue and assist
all indigenous groups currently in distress in various parts of the
globe. Let them have self-determination and the comfort of the freedoms that can be happily shared by all.
Wishful thinking and popular aspirations apart, endeavours
should be made to secure the adoption and implementation of the
draft U.N. International Bill of Rights for the Indigenous Peoples,
who have every where and at all times endured countless and endless
sufferings. If everything, good or evil, must come to an end, there
should be ways and means of ending these sufferings. With this common resolve, at all levels, international, regional, national, provincial, municipal and village, it becomes transparent that legal
development and evolution, in this as well as in all other areas, proceeds within a given time-frame. Thus, the law relating to the status
of the indigenous peoples, both international and comparative, can
and must be viewed in its proper temporal dimension. What was considered not wrongful yesterday may be prohibited today, such as genocide and ethnocide. What is not yet recognized today may receive
general recognition tomorrow, such as the U.N. Draft Declaration on
the Rights of the Indigenous Peoples. There is still hope for all, as the
applicable law, international and national or comparative, cannot be
otherwise than inter-temporal.

